Comments ‘Strategic Maneuvering through Persuasive Definitions: Implications for Dialectic and Rhetoric’ by unknown
Commentary
Comments Strategic Maneuvering through Persuasive
Deﬁnitions: Implications for Dialectic and Rhetoric
BILAL AMJARSO




In Methods and Criteria of Reasoning, published in 1957, Rupert
Crawshay-Williams indicated that speakers can enhance the acceptabil-
ity of a statement by manipulating the scope of the deﬁnitions that
they give of the terms they use in their statements (p. 16). Crawshay-
Wiliams, however, did not explain how language users still succeed in
persuading others to accept their views even though these deﬁnitions
may upon closer scrutiny turn out to be inaccurate. In his paper, Stra-
tegic Maneuvering through Persuasive Deﬁnitions: Implications for
Dialectic and Rhetoric, David Zarefesky addresses just this question.
I understand Zarefskys analysis of persuasive deﬁnitions as an
attempt to discuss an important question relating to the potential
uniﬁcation of rhetoric with dialectics, namely the question as to how
to achieve this uniﬁcation. Besides the fact that the paper ﬁlls in a gap
about one ubiquitous and yet insuﬃciently studied rhetorical strategy,
namely persuasive deﬁnitions, it also comes as a natural continuation
to Zarefskys most recent work, where he discussed the adaptation of
the pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion to rhetorical
argument (Zarefsky, 2006).
Zarefsky is concerned with the question as to why a deﬁnition can
be an obstacle for a normatively fruitful argumentative exchange and
at the same time an eﬀective technique for persuading speciﬁc
audiences. He proceeds to answer this question by regarding the use of
deﬁnitions in argumentative discourse as a form of strategic manoeu-
vring. Writing from a rhetorical perspective, the author acknowledges
the dialectical structure underpinning deﬁnitions and attempts to
investigate the possibility of viewing it in relation to its rhetorical
function. To clarify his approach, he gives a critical analysis of George
W. Bushs deﬁnition of the September 11 attacks as an act of war as a
means for legitimising his subsequent military actions. In this essay I
attempt an analysis of Zarefskys approach, focusing mainly on his
application of the concept of strategic manoeuvring and on his dissoci-
ation between the rhetorical and dialectical models of argument.
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Zarefskys application of the concept of strategic manoeuvring to
the analysis of persuasive deﬁnitions is characterised by some reluc-
tance. Speciﬁcally, when it comes to the question as to how deﬁnitions
function persuasively in actual argumentative discourse regardless of
their soundness, he suggests that a normative approach in which an
ideal model of critical discussion is central may not be helpful because
this model imposes obligations on arguers that are diﬀerent from, and
more restraining than, those imposed by the rhetorical situation in
which persuasive deﬁnitions occur. As an alternative, he proposes that
for a more insightful perspective, the concept of strategic manoeuvring
could be integrated into a rhetorical perspective. He explains that per-
suasive deﬁnitions in which a rule of critical discussion has been vio-
lated, resulting thus in the derailment of strategic manoeuvring, are
only fallacious in the idealised context of critical discussion and not in
the context of resolving actual public disputes. The resulting picture
that almost takes full shape towards the end of the paper consists of a
strategic manoeuvring that is independent of the normative model of
critical discussion.
In my opinion, van Eemeren and Houtlossers (1999, 2003) incorpo-
ration of the rhetorical dimension of argumentative discourse into the
pragma-dialectical framework through introducing the concept of
strategic manoeuvring stems from a recognition of the inherency of the
arguers pursuit for rhetorical eﬀects in any act of argumentation. This
pursuit has been conceptualised in terms of the arguers ambition of
resolving the diﬀerence of opinion in his own favour. The aim of con-
ceiving of the arguers conduct within argumentative exchanges as
strategic manoeuvring is not to make any statements about how argu-
ers can enhance their persuasiveness, but rather to improve the evalua-
tive potential of the pragma-dialectical theory by bringing into its
normative component the view that some of the fallacies that may be
committed in argumentative practice can be justiﬁed by considering
the rhetorical ends that go with these practices (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser, 1999).
Surely, it does not follow from admitting that strategic manoeu-
vring takes place at every stage of discussion that the arguer can ever
be dispensed of observing the rules of critical discussion. Sound strate-
gic manoeuvring is one thing and being persuasive is another. The
former is a combination of dialectical and rhetorical success while the
latter is attainable without dialectical success. One may conclude that,
since the use of deﬁnitions takes place in rhetorical settings and since
one may resort to a bogus deﬁnition just to get his views accepted, it
becomes possible to explain why deﬁnitions are sometimes fallacious
and yet persuasive. Therefore, the fact that a fallacious deﬁnition
is persuasive for some audience and not for another does not
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immediately mean that relying on the ideal model no longer helps, but
only that, for diﬀerent reasons—which can only be established empiri-
cally—some audiences may not be able to notice the fallaciousness of
some deﬁnitions, while others may.
One challenging part of Zarefskys approach is his clear-cut separa-
tion between a dialectical and a rhetorical situation. Starting from the
rhetorical model of persuading an audience, Zarefsky states that ‘‘it is
strategic manoeuvring all the way down.’’ I agree with him, but the
concept of strategic manoeuvring may not have its proper meaning
without an ideal model of critical discussion against which argumenta-
tive discourse can be evaluated. In other words, in order for arguers to
manoeuvre strategically through deﬁning terms in advantageous ways,
they need two or more potentially conﬂicting goals to manoeuvre
between, namely the dialectical goal, with its rules and commitments,
and the rhetorical goal, with its opportunities. Placing strategic
manoeuvring in a purely rhetorical framework and disregarding the
ideal model deprive the practice of strategic manoeuvring of its
essential nature, and perhaps even of the reason for its existence. In
fact, within a rhetorical model, strategic manoeuvring becomes almost
self-cancelling.
Placing the practice of persuasive deﬁnitions within a dialectical
context, Zarefsky argues, would have implications that do not square
with the conditions under which persuasive deﬁnitions normally func-
tion. In my understanding, the fact that with speciﬁc audiences and
under speciﬁc circumstances some arguers may manage to attain per-
suasive eﬀects by means of deﬁnitions that are normatively speaking
fallacious does not mean that the ideal model ceases to function mean-
ingfully for those situations. As pointed out above, this discrepancy is
already taken into account in the concept of strategic manoeuvring. In
fact, even within these less-than-ideal contexts, not any deﬁnition that
the arguer may favour is persuasive and it is quite possible to ﬁnd
cases in which some fallacious deﬁnitions are consistently unpersuasive
because they are found fallacious—although this remains an empirical
claim that neither dialectics nor rhetoric is meant to account for on its
own.
One might ﬁnd Zarefskys proposition to consider two separate
argumentative situations, one rhetorical and another dialectical, more
understandable if one would also accept to reduce the analytic poten-
tial of the pragma-dialectical approach to only those argumentative
exchanges in which two participants mutually strive to resolve a diﬀer-
ence of opinion in a reasonable way, but such is not the case; a situa-
tion in which a speaker takes up the task of persuading a (passive)
audience to adopt a certain point of view can still be conceived of as
dialectical, without undermining the rhetorical nature of the situation.
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For a proper evaluation of the discourse, the audience will be recon-
structed as an antagonist who is in a state of doubt, unless there are
clues for an alternative reconstruction, and hence as assuming fewer
obligations than the speaker (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 1999).
Certainly, it is dialectically speaking hard to imagine that even an
audience may come to assume a burden of proof for challenging a
certain deﬁnition, or any argument for that matter, but the burden of
proof, while essentially dialectical, is also subject to the pragmatic
impositions of the situation; these impositions can sometimes
aﬀect (the order of) its allocation quite radically (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser 2003).
To conclude, although Zarefsky clearly favours a uniﬁcation
between dialectics and rhetoric through the integration of the former
into the latter, he does acknowledge that ‘‘which way we proceed does
not really matter’’. This, he maintains, depends on the aims of the
research project within which the integrating attempt is carried out.
Zarefsky, nonetheless, does not deny that either way has its implica-
tions for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse and
can provide diﬀerent insights into the way people go about persuading
each other. If anything, this commentary is meant to further underline
the challenges of taking one or the other direction.
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